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THE LAW AND POLITICS OF QUEBEC
SECESSION"
BY PATRICK J. MONAHAN*
This paper considers the various legal issues that would
arise in the context of Quebec's secession from Canada,
and attempts to situate these issues politically. The
author argues that, under the current constitutional
amending formula, Quebec secession would require the
support of the federal Parliament as well as the
unanimous consent of the provinces; he also suggests
that it is extremely unlikely that this level of support
would be attained. The paper goes on to explore the
possibility of Quebec seceding from Canada through a
unilateral declaration of independence (ui),
suggesting that the success or failure of a uni would
depend upon the ability of Quebec to exercise effective
and exclusive control over its own territory and
population. The author also argues that a Quebec UDi
would almost certainly be contested by Canada, thus
precipitating a costly contest for legal supremacy
between the Canadian and Quebec governments. The
legal, economic, and political uncertainty associated
with two rival regimes would impose enormous costs on
everyone involved, leading to author to conclude that a
Quebec uDi is a legal possibility, but quite impractical
and unacceptable in pragmatic political terms. The
final section of the paper considers the implications of
the recent proposals for joint political institutions
between a sovereign Quebec and Canada, claiming that
joint political institutions are unlikely to be created
following sovereignty.
Cet article considare les questions 16gales qui
rdsulteraient d'une s&cession qu6becoise et 6value ces
questions dans leur contexte politique. L'auteur
propose que actuellement, selon la proc6dure de
r~vision constitutionnelle, le Parlement f~d6ral aussi
que toutes les provinces devraient etre en faveur d'une
s6cession qu6becoise. L'auteur sugg6re qu'il est
presque impossible qu'on r6usisse A atteindre tel appui
politique. L'article examine aussi la possibilit6 que le
Qudbec fasse s~cession du Canada par moyen dune
declaration d'ind6pendance unlitat6rale (Diu), dont I
succAs d~pendra du contrdle exerc6 par le Qu~bec sur
son territoire et sa population. L'auteur soutient aussi
qu'une Diu qu6becoise serait certainement contest.e
par le Canada et par cons6quent, il y aurait un conflit
co/teux en matiare de supr6matie 1dgale entre les
gouvernements qu6becois et canadien. Les incertitudes
lgales, politiques, et 6conomiques associ6es avec les
deux r6gimes rivaux cr6eralent des cot(ts dnormes pour
tout le monde, ce qul mane l'auteur A conclure qu'une
DIU qu6becoise est une possibilit6 16gale mais
inacceptable et non-pratique en termes pragmatiques
et politiques. La partie finale de l'article considare la
possibilit6 d'avoir des institutions politiques communes
entre le Quebec et le Canada tel qu'on a r6cemment
propos6 et quelles seraient les implications de ces
institutions. L'auteur est d'avis qu'il est peu probable
que ces institutions poilitiques communes soient cr6des
apras rtablissment d'un Qu6bec souverain.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While law will obviously not determine the outcome of the
current debate over Quebec's status within Canada, it will certainly have
an important impact on its resolution. Most of the key issues in the
debate-including Quebec's "right to secede" from Canada, its
obligations in respect of the existing Canadian public debt, its claims to
territorial integrity, and its ability to negotiate a political and economic
association with Canada following secession-raise important legal
questions.
Of course, it is highly unlikely that any of these highly politicized
issues will ever be resolved by judges and courts. Moreover, given the
novelty and unpredictability of the scenarios associated with the
secession of a province from Canada, it is difficult to offer confident
assertions as to the correct legal position on many of the questions in
dispute. But careful analysis of the relevant legal issues is both
appropriate and necessary. Law is always a critical variable in any
political controversy, since it provides the framework within which
political decisions will be made and affects the relative bargaining
strength of the decision-makers. Moreover, legal arguments have
significant political currency. Both the federalist and sovereigntist forces
have devoted considerable time and resources in order to demonstrate
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that their preferred outcome is supported by either domestic or
international lawj
This paper considers the various legal issues that would arise in
the context of Quebec's secession from Canada, and attempts to situate
these issues within the larger political context in which they would be
resolved. The analysis falls into three parts. The first section examines
the manner in which Quebec could secede from Canada in accordance
with a duly-authorized constitutional amendment, proclaimed in
accordance with the amending formula contained in Part V of the
Constitution Act 1982.2 I argue that Quebec secession would require the
support of the federal Parliament as well as the unanimous consent of
the provinces, since it would fall under section 41 of Part V. I also argue
that it is extremely unlikely that a constitutional amendment authorizing
Quebec secession would attain this level of support.
The second section of the paper explores the possibility of
Quebec seceding from Canada through a unilateral declaration of
independence (UDI), as opposed to a constitutional amendment. I
suggest that Quebec has no right to secede under international law. Nor
would Quebec's current borders be guaranteed under international law
if it attempted to unilaterally declare its independence from Canada.
The success or failure of a uDI, therefore, would depend upon the ability
of Quebec to exercise effective control over its own territory and
population, and to exclude the authority of the Canadian government.
Against this legal background, the second section of the paper
goes on to consider the manner in which political events might unfold if
Quebec were to attempt to secede from Canada through a UDI. I argue
that a Quebec uDI would almost certainly be contested by Canada, thus
precipitating a costly contest for legal supremacy between the Canadian
and Quebec governments. The legal, economic and political uncertainty
associated with two rival regimes competing for authority and legitimacy
would impose enormous costs on everyone involved. Even with
assurances that sovereignty can be achieved with a minimum of
1 One recent illustration is the legal opinion commissioned by the Quebec government from
an American law firm suggesting that an independent Quebec would likely be able to accede to
NAFTA: see D. Bernstein & W. Silverman, Advisory Memorandum Regarding the Effect of
Independence of Quebec Upon Treaties and Agreement with the United States of America (legal
opinion prepared by Rogers and Wells, New York, 7 March 1995). This prompted the Quebec
Liberal Party to commission a legal opinion from an American lw firm which came to the opposite
conclusion: see C.N. Brower, Advisory Memorandum Regarding the Effect of Independence of Quebec
upon Treaties and Agreements with the United States (legal opinion prepared by white and Case,
Washington, D.C., 21 March, 1995).
2 Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter "Part V"].
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economic dislocation, barely one-half of the Quebec population supports
this option. It seems implausible to imagine that more than a small
minority of Quebecers would be prepared to contemplate the major
dislocations associated with a legal revolution. I conclude that a Quebec
UDI is a legal possibility, but quite impractical and unacceptable in
pragmatic political terms.
The final section of the paper considers the implications of the
recent proposals for joint political institutions between a sovereignQuebec and Canada, as reflected in the agreement signed in June 1995
by the Premier of Quebec, the Leader of the Parti Action D6mocratique,
and the Leader of the Bloc Qu6b6cois. I suggest that joint political
institutions are unlikely to be created following sovereignty, since they
are not in the interest of either Quebec or Canada. In any event, the
only manner in which such joint political institutions could be created
would be through an agreement reached prior to the effective date of
sovereignty. In other words, a Quebec UDI (which, by definition, is a
declaration of sovereignty issued without Canadian consent) would
effectively rule out the possibility of creating joint political institutions.
II. THE LEGAL CONTINUITY SCENARIO 3
Quebec's accession to sovereignty could occur in one of two
possible ways. The first is through an amendment to the Constitution of
Canada, in accordance with the procedure set out in Part V of the
Constitution Act, 1982. The second possibility is a Quebec UDI, in whichQuebec seeks to jump outside of the rules governing amendment of the
Canadian Constitution and establish a new constitutional order based on
a revolutionary break with existing law.
3 This section builds on the analysis I developed in Cooler Heads Shall Prevai" Assessing the
Costs and Consequences of Quebec Separation (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1995) [hereinafter
CoolerHeads]. For a competing view on the issues examined in this section, see J. Woehrling, "Les
aspects juridiques d'une dventuelle accession du Qu6bec A la soverainetd," Chox serie Quebec-
Canada, 1-12 (June 1995) 25 [hereinafter "Les aspects juridiques"], and "Les aspects juridiques de
la red6finition du statut politique et constitutionnel du Qudbec" in lments d'analyseinstitutionnelle, juridique et d4molinguistique pertinents a la rivision du statut politique et
constitutionnel du Quebec, (Document de travail no. 2) (Qu6bec: Commission sur l'avenir politique
et constitutionnel du Qu6bec, 1991) 1 [hereinafter tl~ments d'analyse institutionnelle]. Professor
Woehrling's analysis is considered in detail below.
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A. Quebec Secession is Legally Possible
The Constitution of Canada is silent on the right of a province to
secede from the federation. Yet the absence of any explicit reference to
secession should not lead one to suppose that it cannot occur under the
terms of the existing amending formula.
The province of Quebec is referred to repeatedly throughout the
Constitution Act, 1867.4 The secession of Quebec would therefore
require the amendment or repeal of these various provisions. Since all
the provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867 are part of the "Constitution
of Canada,"5 and since amendments to the "Constitution of Canada"
can only be made in accordance with the amending formula in Part V,
6
this formula must govern the secession of Quebec from Canada.
The more difficult question is not whether Quebec could secede
in accordance with the existing amending formula, but how secession
could occur. More specifically, which of the various procedures set out
in Part V would apply in the case of the secession of Quebec?
B. Quebec Secession Would Require Unanimous Consent
Some authors have argued that the general amending formula in
section 38 of the Constitution Act, 1982 would govern Quebec secession.
7
Accordingly, on this view, Quebec secession could be accomplished with
4 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. Quebec is referred to in, for example: section 5 ("Canada shall be
divided into Four Provinces, named Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick"); section 6
(creating Ontario and Quebec out of the Parts of the former Province of Canada); sections 22 and
23(6) (providing for representation in the Senate from Quebec, and specifying certain requirements
for Quebec Senators); section 40 (providing for Quebec representation in the House of Commons);
section 71 (providing for the Legislature of Quebec, consisting of the Lieutenant Governor and of
Two Houses); section 93(2) (providing for denominational school rights in the province of Quebec);
and section 133 (providing for rights to use the English or the French Language in the Quebec
Legislature and Courts of the province of Quebec).
5 See section 52(2) of the Constitution Ac4 1982, supra note 2.
6 See, ibid. at section 52(3).
7 See P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 126; and
J. Woehrling, "Les aspects juridiques," supra note 3 at 26-28, and Mnents d'analyse institutionnelle,
ibid. at 55-57.
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the consent of the Senate, the House of Commons, and the legislative
assemblies of seven provinces with at least fifty percent of the total
provincial population.
In my view, however, section 41 of the Constitution Act, 1982
would govern the secession of Quebec from Canada. The secession ofQuebec would appear to involve an amendment in relation to at least
three of the five matters referred to in section 41, including:
1. the office of the Lieutenant Governor of Quebec (Section 41(a);
2. the use of the English and French language (Section 41(c)); and
3. the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada (Section
41(d)).
1. Lieutenant Governor of the province of Quebec-section 41(a)
The Constitution of Canada provides that executive power in
each province shall be vested in a Lieutenant Governor. 8 In addition to
a general reference to the office of Lieutenant Governor in section 58,
there are a number of specific references to the Lieutenant Governors of
particular provinces, including the province of Quebec. Thus, section 71
of the Constitution Act, 1867 provides that "[t]here shall be a Legislature
for Quebec consisting of the Lieutenant Governor and of Two Houses,
styled the Legislative Council of Quebec9 and the Legislative Assembly
of Quebec." (The office of Lieutenant Governor in Ontario,10
8 ConstitutionAc4 1867, supra note 4, s. 58.
9 The Legislative Council was abolished by the National Assembly in 1965, pursuant to its
authority under section 92(1) of the Constitution Ac4 1867, supra note 4, to amend "the Constitution
of the province, except as regards the Office of Lieutenant Governor." The Supreme Court ofCanada noted the fact that a number of provinces had abolished their upper houses in Re Upper
House, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54 at 74. Although section 92(1) excepted from provincial authority the
"Office of the Lieutenant Governor," the abolition of an upper house did not diminish the role and
function of the Lieutenant Governor in the legislative process, and it is presumably on this basis that
the provincial actions fell within the scope of section 92(1). For a discussion, see Hogg, supra note 7
at 352-53. Section 92(1) was repealed in 1982.
10 Constitution Act 1867, supra note 4, s. 69.
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Manitoba,11 Prince Edward Island,12 Alberta,13 Saskatchewan, 14 and
Newfoundland15 is likewise specifically referenced in the Constitution.
16)
The office of the Lieutenant Governor of Quebec, an appointee
of the federal government, would necessarily be abolished upon the
secession of Quebec. This is so even though the draft bill declaring the
sovereignty of Quebec1 7 makes no reference to the office of the
Lieutenant Governor. The reason is that the Lieutenant Governor is an
appointee of the government of Canada. Quebec cannot attain the
status of a sovereign state, as is declared in section 1 of the Draft
Sovereignty Bill, and permit executive power to reside in an appointee of
a "foreign," i.e., Canadian government. Therefore, the declaration in
section 1 of the Draft Sovereignty Bill that Quebec is a sovereign country
is, in substance, an attempt to abolish the office of Lieutenant
Governor. 18
It is clearly not open to any province to unilaterally abolish the
office of Lieutenant Governor.9herefore, inasmuch as the secession of
Quebec would entail the abolition of the Lieutenant Governor of the
11 ManitobaAct 1870, S.C. 1870, c. 3, s. 6.
12 See Prince Edward Island Terms of Union (Order of Her Majesty in Council admitting
Prince Edward Island into the Union, June 23, 1870), which provides that "the Dominion
Government shall assume and defray all the charges for ... the salary of the Lieutenant Governor."
13Alberta Act, S.C. 1905, c. 3, s. 10.
14 Saskatchewan Act, S.C. 1905, c. 42, s. 10.
15NewfoundlandAct (U.K.), 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 22, s. 8.
16 It is arguable that the office of the Lieutenant Governor of British Columbia is also
specifically referenced in the Constitution. Although the British Columbia Terms of Union do not
explicitly refer to the office of Lieutenant Governor, they do state that all of the provisions of the
British NorthAmericaAc4 1867 apply to British Columbia, except to the extent that such provisions
are clearly only applicable to one or more of the other provinces. The effect of this incorporation by
reference is to create the office of Lieutenant Governor for British Columbia. The offices of
Lieutenant Governor in the remaining two provinces, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, appear to
have been achieved through the operation of section 58 of the Constitution Ac 1867, supra note 4.
17 See (Draft Bill) An Act respecting the sovereignty of Quebec, 1st Sess., 35th Leg., Quebec,
1994 [hereinafter Draft Sovereignty Bill].
18 Also noteworthy is that under the Draft Sovereignty Bill, ibid., sections 2, 3, and 15 are to
come into force on the day following the day the Act is approved by referendum: see s. 16.
However, according to section 10 of the Referendum Act, S.Q. 1978, c. 6, no bill that is to be the
subject of a referendum may be presented for royal assent until after a referendum. This raises the
question of whether the assent of the Lieutenant Governor can be obtained in a timely manner, and
even raises the possibility that assent may not be sought for the bill if there is a majority "yes" vote.
19 Provincial power to amend the "constitution of the province" (Constitution Ac 1982, supra
note 2, s. 45) is expressly made subject to section 41, which includes thi office of the Lieutenant
Governor of a province.
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province, it would appear to amount to an amendment "in relation to"
the office of Lieutenant Governor and fall under section 41(a).
Professor Woehrling, in two important articles, has argued thatQuebec secession could occur in accordance with section 38 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, and thus would require the consent of only seven
provinces representing 50 per cent of the population. 0 Professor
Woehrling offers two possible responses to the claim that provincial
secession would involve an amendment in relation to the office of the
Lieutenant Governor of the province.
The first response is based on the "pith and substance" doctrine,
under which courts classify legislation for constitutional purposes
according to its "dominant feature." The main purpose of any
amendment authorizing the secession of Quebec is to alter the
relationship between Quebec and Canada. The abolition of the office of
Lieutenant Governor is a subsidiary and relatively unimportant aspect of
the declaration of sovereignty. Therefore, Professor Woehrling claims,
it is misleading to characterize the secession of Quebec as an
amendment "in relation to" the Lieutenant Governor, since this suggests
that the abolition of the Lieutenant Governor is somehow the primary or
dominant focus of the amendment. The abolition of the office of
Lieutenant Governor is merely an "incidental effect" of secession, rather
than its main purpose.2 '
The difficulty with this line of argument is that it seems to
assume that a constitutional amendment must necessarily be classified as
being "in relation to" only one of the various amending procedures set
out in Part V. In fact, as the experience with the ratification of the
Meech Lake Accord (MLA) made plain, a single constitutional
amendment might simultaneously be subject to a number of different
provisions in Part V. This is because a single constitutional amendment
might simultaneously amend a number of different provisions of the
Constitution of Canada, each of which is subject to a number of different
procedures in Part V. The NLA would have amended a variety of
constitutional provisions, some of which were subject to section 41,22
while others were governed by section 38. It was generally accepted that
the entire constitutional package had to meet all applicable
requirements. The MLA was therefore subject to the unanimity
20 See Woehrling, "Les aspects juridiques," supra note 3, and -0l1ments d'analyse
institudonnele, ibid.
21 See Woehrlng, "Les aspects juridiques," ibid. at 27-28.
22 The mLA amended the amending formula as well as the composition of the Supreme Court
of Canada.
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procedure, as well as to the three-year time limit applicable to section 38
amendments 23 In other words, the requirements of the amending
formula were seen as being cumulative rather than disjunctive. It was
therefore not possible to escape the unanimity requirements by coupling
section 41 amendments with others that fall under section 38, and argue
that the amendment as a whole was "in relation to" section 38 alone.
The same result would follow with respect to a constitutional
amendment authorizing the secession of Quebec. In determining the
requirements of the amending formula, it is necessary to identify those
parts of the Constitution of Canada that are being amended. An
amendment declaring the sovereignty of Quebec would involve the
amendment of a wide variety of constitutional provisions, some of which
fall under section 38, others under 41. Since the requirements of the
amending formula are cumulative, the entire amendment must satisfy all
applicable requirements, including that of unanimity under section 41.
This conclusion would be more obvious if the Draft Sovereignty
Bill specifically provided in section 1 that the Office of the Lieutenant
Governor of Quebec is to be abolished. Surely it is evident that any such
provision would be an amendment "in relation to" the office of the
Lieutenant Governor.2 4 If this is so, then the argument on this issue
seems to boil down to the fact that the Draft Sovereignty Bill does not
specifically state that the office of Lieutenant Governor is abolished.
But the absence of an explicit reference to the office of Lieutenant
Governor cannot be determinative for constitutional purposes.
Provinces cannot avoid the requirements of section 41 of Part V simply
by drafting legislation in such a way as to make no explicit reference to
the matters set out in section 41. If, in substance, the province has
purported to abolish the office of Lieutenant Governor, then the
legislation must meet the requirements of section 41. Otherwise form
would triumph over substance and the requirements of Part V would be
rendered meaningless.
Professor Woehrling's second argument on this issue is that as
long as the office of the Lieutenant Governor is left intact in the
provinces that are, from time to time, a part of Canada, there has not
23 See, for example, the discussion in Hogg, supra note 7 at 83.
24 The only question would be whether such an obviously invalid provision could be "severed"
from the remainder of the bill, or whether the entire enactment would necessarily fall along with the
impugned provision. It would be impossible for Quebec to continue to operate with the existing
Lieutenant Governor following secession. Therefore, the attempt to abolish the office of
Lieutenant Governor is inextricably tied to the legislation as a whole, and the invalidity of such a
provision purporting to abolish the office would mean that the entire statute would be rendered
ultra vires.
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been an amendment "in relation to" the office of the Lieutenant
Governor. Thus, because the Lieutenant Governors in the other nine
provinces are unaffected by the abolition of the office of the Lieutenant
Governor of Quebec, section 41(a) of Part V is not implicated.
Professor Woehrling believes that certain comments made by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Quebec (A.G.) v. Blaikie25 with respect to
Quebec's right to abolish its Legislative Council, support this
interpretation of section 4126
This argument might be plausible if there was a generic
reference to the office of Lieutenant Governor, without specifically
providing for particular officers in named provinces. For example,
suppose that the only reference to the office of the Lieutenant Governor
was in section 58 of the Constitution Act, 1867. If this were the case, it
might be thought that the abolition of the offices of one or more
Lieutenant Governors would not amount to an amendment "in relation
to" section 58, since that provision does not make reference to or
assume the existence of any particular Lieutenant Governors in
particular provinces. But, as noted above, section 58 is not the only
reference to the office of Lieutenant Governor. The Lieutenant
Governor of the province of Quebec is specifically created by section 71
of the Constitution Act, 1867 (as are the offices of the Lieutenant
Governors of six or seven other provinces specifically created elsewhere
in the Constitution). Therefore, regardless of whether the abolition of
Quebec's Lieutenant Governor amounts to an amendment to section 58,
it is unavoidably an amendment to section 71. The statement in section
71 that "there shall be a ... Lieutenant Governor" for Quebec would be
negated by the declaration of sovereignty. The abolition of the office of
25 [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016 [hereinafter Blai/de].
2 6 See Woehrling, "Les aspects juridiques," supra note 3 at 39, note 8. One of the questions
that arose in Blaikie was whether the province could amend section 128 of the Constitution Act,
1867, supra note 4 pursuant to its authority in section 92(1) to amend "the Constitution of the
Province, except as regards the Office of Lieutenant Governor." Although the Supreme Court of
Canada did not decide this issue, it did note that
section 128, referring to the taking of a prescribed oath of allegiance ... before the
Lieutenant-Governor of a Province by elected or appointed members of the ... provincial
Legislative Assembly or Council, as the case may be, raises a different issue, referable to
the office of the ... Lieutenant-Governor and touching the Crown in respect of the
members of the legislative chambers, so long as such chambers exist.
Professor Woehrling notes that, although the province may not have been able to amend the
requirement of an oath of allegiance by members of the Legislative Council, it was able to abolish
the Legislative Council entirely. He reasons that, although the province may not be able to modify
the powers of the Lieutenant-Governor, it can abolish the office entirely.
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Lieutenant Governor of Quebec must therefore amount to an
amendment in relation to section 71?7
2. The use of the English and French language-section 41(c)
Section 41(c) provides that amendments in relation to "the use
of the English and French language" require unanimous consent.
However, section 41(c) is expressly made subject to section 43, which
applies to amendments to constitutional provisions that apply to "one or
more, but not all, provinces." This means that those constitutional
provisions dealing with the use of the English or the French language in
some but not all provinces may be amended by resolutions passed by the
Senate and House of Commons and those provinces affected by the
amendment. There are a significant number of constitutional provisions
that fall within this class.2 8 However, other constitutional provisions
dealing with the use of the English and French language in all provinces
or in federal institutions 9 are subject to section 41(c) and would require
unanimous provincial consent.
The secession of Quebec would mean that these "section 41(c)"
language guarantees would no longer be available to the Anglophone
minority in Quebec. This is significant because, as we shall see, the
Supreme Court of Canada has found that at least one of these section
41(c) language guarantees-section 23 of the Charter30-was enacted
specifically to guarantee language rights to Quebec Anglophones.
Therefore, because the secession of Quebec would negate the
underlying purpose and effect of section 23 of the Charter, it would
arguably amount to an amendment in relation to section 23 and fall
under section 41(c) of Part V.
2 7 Nor is this conclusion altered by the Supreme Court of Canada's comments in Bla/e supra
note 25 respecting the right of the province to abolish its Legislative Council. While the abolition of
the Legislative Council merely "affected" the status and rights of the Crown, rather than being an
amendment "in relation to" the Crown, the same could not be said of an amendment abolishing the
office of Lieutenant Governor of a province.
28 See, for example, section 133 of the Constitution Ac4 1867,supra note 4; and sections 16(2),
17(2), 18(2), 19(2), and 20(2) of the ConstitutionAc4 1982, supra note 2.
29 See sections 133 of the Constitution Ac4 1867, ibid., as regards federal institutions; and
sections 16(1), 17(1), 18(1), 19(1), 20(1), 21,22, and 23 of the ConstitutionAc 1982, ibid.
30 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Ac4 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
1995]
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The leading case on the interpretation of section 23 of the
Charter is Quebec (A.G.) v. Quebec Protestant School Boards.31 In
Protestant School Boards, the Supreme Court of Canada described
section 23 of the Charter as a "unique set of constitutional provisions,
quite peculiar to Canada.13 2 In drafting section 23, the Court opined,
"the framers knew, and clearly had in mind the regimes governing the
Anglophone and Francophone linguistic minorities in various provinces
of Canada as far as the language of instruction was concerned."33 The
Court found that the drafters of the Charterwere particularly concerned
with the limitations on the rights of the Anglophone minority in Quebec
as a result of Quebec's Bill 101,34 and drafted section 23 as a specific
response to that legislation:
The framers of the Constitution unquestionably intended by s. 23 to establish a general
regime for the language of instruction, not a special regime for Quebec; but in view of the
period when the Charter was enacted, and especially in light of the wording of s. 23 of the
Charter as compared with that of ss. 72 and 73 of Bill 101, it is apparent that the combined
effect of the latter two sections seemed to the framers like an archetype of the regimes
needing reform, or which at least had to be affected, and the remedy prescribed for all of
Canada by s. 23 of the Charter was in large part a response to these sections.35
The Court went on to examine the similarities in the structure of
section 23 of the Charter and the relevant provisions in Bill 101, noting
that the similarities were such that "it may be wondered whether the
framers of the Constitution would have drafted s. 23 of the Charter as
they did if they had not had in view the model which s. 23 was indeed in
large measure meant to override. '3 6 The Court concluded as follows:
By incorporating into the structure of s. 23 of the Charter the unique set of criteria in s. 73
of Bill 101, the framers of the Constitution identified the type of regime they wished to
correct and on which they would base the remedy prescribed. The framers' objective
appears simple, and may readily be inferred from the concrete method used by them: to
adopt a general rule guaranteeing the Francophone and Anglophone minorities in
Canada an important part of the rights which the Anglophone minority in Quebec had
enjoyed with respect to the language of instruction before Bill 101 was adopted.3 7
31 [1984] 2 S.C.RL 66 [hereinafter Protestant School Boards].
32 Ibid at 79.
33 Ibid.
3 4 Charte de la Languefran~aise, 31st Leg., 2d Sess., Quebec, 1977 [hereinafter Bill 101].
35 Ibid. at 79-80.
36Ibid. at 84.
3 7 bad
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Thus, while section 23 contains a language regime applicable
across Canada, the "prototype" for the section was Quebec's Bill 101.
Therefore, the Court held that those provisions in Bill 101 that were
inconsistent with section 23 could not be regarded as legitimate "limits"
on rights, within the meaning of section 1 of the Charter.
The Protestant School Boards case makes it clear that the Quebec
government cannot repeal or amend section 23 of the Charter. Yet that
is precisely the effect of a declaration of sovereignty by Quebec. Since a
declaration of sovereignty amounts to a repeal of section 23 of the
Charter in Quebec, it would appear to be subject to section 41(c) of Part
V and so can only be enacted with unanimous provincial consent, as well
as the approval of the Senate and House of Commons.
It might be observed that the draft Act respecting the sovereignty
of Quebec38 makes no specific reference to limits on the rights of the
Anglophone minority in Quebec. In fact, the draft bill states that the
constitution of an independent Quebec shall "guarantee the English-
speaking community that its identity and institutions will be
preserved."3 9 It might therefore be argued that the Anglophone
minority's rights will be unaffected by Quebec's secession, except for the
fact that these rights would henceforth be exercised within the new state
of Quebec rather than Canada. But this ignores the fact that the rights
of the Anglophone minority would have been significantly diminished,
since they would no longer enjoy the protection of the Canadian
Constitution or have recourse to Canadian Courts. Whereas under the
Canadian Constitution their section 23 rights could only be diminished
through a constitutional amendment passed by the Senate, the House of
Commons, and the legislatures of all ten provinces, these rights would
now be dependent upon the terms of the Quebec constitution and
Quebec statute. Thus, even if the constitution of the new Quebec state
incorporated the exact wording of section 23 of the Charter, the rights of
the Anglophone minority would still have been negatively affected.
I conclude that the better view is that the secession of Quebec
would constitute an amendment to section 23 of the Charter, a provision
dealing with the use of the English and the French language, and that
the amendment therefore falls under section 41(c) of Part V.
3 8 Supra note 17.
39 Ibid., Art. 3.
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3. Composition of the Supreme Court of Canada-section 41(d)
The Supreme Court Act 40 currently guarantees Quebec three
members on the Supreme Court of Canada. Although the Quebec
government has suggested that a sovereign Quebec might establish joint
political institutions with Canada (including judicial institutions),
presumably Quebec would not have representation on the Supreme
Court of Canada. Therefore the composition of the Supreme Court of
Canada would necessarily be altered as a result of the secession of
Quebec, and the amendment would be subject to section 41(d) of Part
V.
There is a counterargument to this line of reasoning, based on
the fact that the Supreme Court Act is not explicitly included in the
definition of the "Constitution of Canada" in section 52(2) of the
Constitution Act, 1982. Therefore, according to this counterargument,
amendments to the Supreme Court Act, including changes to the
composition of the Supreme Court of Canada, are not "amendments to
the Constitution of Canada" and fall completely outside of Part V.41
This interpretation of section 41(d) leads to a number of
anomalous results. First, it means that Quebec's representation on the
Supreme Court of Canada could be eliminated without its consent,
through an ordinary statute passed by the Parliament of Canada.
Second, the only way that Quebec could obtain constitutional protection
against this kind of change in its Supreme Court representation would
be to obtain the agreement of all the other provinces. This is because
any amendment entrenching the current composition of the Supreme
Court of Canada in the Constitution would clearly be an amendment "in
relation to the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada," and
therefore be subject to section 41(d). Thus, even if the Senate, the
House of Commons, and the eight other provinces agreed that Quebec's
right to have three judges on the Supreme Court should be
constitutionally entrenched, the amendment could be blocked by the
objection of a single province.
These results are doubly anomalous when placed in the context
of Part V as'a whole. The general amending formula protects the
"legislative powers, the proprietary rights or any other rights or
privileges of the legislature or government of a province" 42 from change,
40 R.S.C. 1985, c. S-19, s. 6.
41 This is the conclusion of Professor Hogg: supra note 7 at 82.
42 Supra note 2, s. 38(2).
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either by requiring provincial consent or by granting a right to "opt out"
of an amendment.43 The overall purpose of the amending procedure, in
other words, is to protect the provinces from having their rights or
privileges negatively affected without their agreement. Yet, according to
this interpretation of section 41(d), the provinces have absolutely no
protection when it comes to the Supreme Court of Canada. Apparently
(at least according to this interpretation of section 41(d)), this key
institution of the federation can be changed by the Parliament of
Canada alone. It is submitted that this interpretation of section 41(d) is
inconsistent with the overall purpose of Part V, as well as with the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada on constitutional
amendment.44
I conclude that the better view is that changes in the composition
of the Supreme Court of Canada are subject to the requirements of
section 41(d). Since the secession of Quebec would alter the
composition of the Supreme Court of Canada, it must satisfy those
requirements.
4. Requirement of Aboriginal consent
Section 35.1 of the Constitution Act, 1982 requires the federal
government and the provincial governments to convene a constitutional
conference, to which representatives of the Aboriginal peoples of
Canada must be invited, prior to amending section 35. But section 35.1
does not specify whether the consent of the Aboriginal peoples must be
obtained in order for the amendment to proceed.
In my view, it is arguable that the government of Canada, which
is under a fiduciary obligation towards Aboriginal peoples in Quebec,45
would be in breach of that fiduciary obligation if it were to agree to the
secession of Quebec without the consent of the Aboriginal peoples who
43 See s. 38(1)-(3) of Part V, supra note 2.
44 See, in particular, Re Upper House, supra note 9, which held that the Parliament of Canada
could not unilaterally alter representation in the Senate, partly on the grounds that the Senate
implicated important provincial interests. It is submitted that Quebee's interest in representation
on the Supreme Court of Canada is at least as important as its representation in the Senate.
45 Aside from the general fiduciary obligation towards Aboriginal peoples recognized by the
Supreme Court in Guerin v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, the federal government has specifically
acknowledged a fiduciary obligation in relation to Aboriginal peoples in Northern Quebec. The
preamble to the federal legislation implementing the James Bay and Northern Quebec Native Claims
Settlement Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 32, provides that the "Parliament and Government of Canada
recognize and affirm a special responsibility for the said Crees and Inuit."
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would be directly affected. This conclusion follows from the fact that the
secession of the province of Quebec would have the effect of terminating
the fiduciary relationship between the federal Crown and the Aboriginal
peoples living in Quebec.
It is arguable that the fiduciary obligation of the federal Crown
requires it to obtain the consent of Aboriginal peoples for any
amendment affecting rights under section 35.46 The point for purposes
of the present' discussion, however, is that the secession of a province
involves a very particular and exceptional derogation from section 35
rights. Since the seceding province would no longer be a part of Canada,
the effect of provincial secession is to permanently terminate the
fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the Aboriginal peoples
concerned.47 To permit the termination of a fiduciary relationship
without the consent of the beneficiary is inconsistent with the very
existence of a fiduciary relationship. It is well established that trust-like
or fiduciary obligations which arise from the operation of law cannot be
unilaterally terminated by the fiduciary.48
Thus, regardless of whether there is a requirement of Aboriginal
consent for a constitutional amendment affecting section 35 rights
generally,49 it would appear that there is such a requirement for an
amendment which would terminate altogether the fiduciary relationship
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. This is precisely the effect
46 See N. Finkelstein & G. Vegh, The Separation of Quebec and the Constitution of Canada
(North York. York University Centre for Public Law and Public Policy, 1992) at 25-31, who argue
that there may be a constitutional convention requiring Aboriginal consent to amendments affecting
rights under section 35. Finkelstein and Vegh were writing prior to the Multilateral Meetings on
the Constitution (MMC), held between March and August of 1992. The 1992 MMC reinforce the
conclusion that there is an emerging constitutional convention requiring the consent of Aboriginal
peoples for any amendment directly affecting section 35 rights. Representatives of the Aboriginal
peoples participated fully in the negotiations, and the Charlottetown Accord (Consensus Report on
the Constitution: Final Text (Charlottetown: 28 August 1992)) contained a provision requiring the
consent of Aboriginal peoples for any constitutional amendments affecting their rights: see Draft
Legal Text (Ottawa: 9 October 1992), art. 33, which would have added section 45.1 to theConstitutionAc 1982. While the Accord was defeated in a referendum, there has never been any
suggestion that the principle underlying proposed section 45.1 is questioned in any way by anyCanadian government. Thus, even though there may not be any legal requirement of Aboriginal
consent for amendments affecting section 35 rights (given the defeat of the Chariottetown Accord),
there seems to be a constitutional convention requiring such consent.
47 1 exclude from consideration the possibility that Aboriginal peoples could maintain their
connection with the federal Crown by migrating from the seceding province into another part ofCanada, since this forced migration would itself be a denial of section 35 rights.
48 See the discussion of a trustee's duties and powers in D.W.M. Waters, Law of Trusts in
Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1984) at 689-93.
49 See note 46 above, arguing that there is a constitutional convention requiring such consent.
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of the secession of a province from Canada. The Aboriginal peoples in
the seceding province would find themselves in a foreign country, their
links with the Crown in right of Canada irrevocably severed. Before the
federal government can agree to a constitutional amendment
terminating this fiduciary relationship, it must obtain the consent of the
Aboriginal peoples who would be affected.
It is apparent that this Aboriginal consent requirement is indirect
in the sense that it must be expressed through and by the government of
Canada. But this does not make the Aboriginal consent requirement
any less meaningful or legally enforceable. The fiduciary obligation of
the government of Canada requires it to obtain the consent of
Aboriginal peoples directly affected before the government endorses any
amendment permitting a province to secede. In the absence of such
consent, the members of the government would be required to oppose
any amendment when such an amendment was presented for
Parliamentary approval. While injunctive relief is generally not available
against the Crown,5 0 an exception applies where the injunction is sought
to prevent a violation of the Constitution. The Crown cannot use its
remedial immunity to shield or further an unconstitutional act.5 1
Therefore, Aboriginal peoples may be able to obtain injunctive relief to
prevent the government from approving an amendment that had not
obtained the necessary Aboriginal consent. 52
C. Achieving the Necessary Agreement is Unlikely
I have argued elsewhere53 that it is highly unlikely that Quebec
would secure the necessary consent for an amendment permitting it to
secede from Canada. Amongst the difficulties are the fact that the
Prime Minister of Canada is from Quebec (making the Canadian
government an inappropriate "Canadian" representative in any
secession negotiations); the complex and divisive nature of the issues
50 See P.W. Hogg, Liability of the Crown, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 22.
51 See SocitAsbestos v. Sociiff Nationale de l'amiante, [1979] CA 342 (Que.), in which an
interlocutory injunction was granted to prevent the implementation of legislation that was
unconstitutional by reason of its enactment in the French language only.
52 The issue would arise as to how a court could ascertain the existence of such consent. It
would appear that the best way to demonstrate consent would be through a referendum conducted
amongst the persons whose rights would be directly affected; that is, those living in the seceding
province.
53 See Cooler Heads, supra note 3.
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(including debt division, currency, territory, and citizenship); the absence
of the necessary time to bring the negotiations to a successful
conclusion; and the fact that any agreement would have to be ratified
through a referendum.5 4
Some commentators have challenged my prediction of failed
negotiations, positing a swift and consensual resolution of all the
issues.55 I would offer two brief observations in response. First, even
those commentators who believe that there would be a quick agreement
between Quebec and Canada concede that the international experience
with secession points in the opposite direction. Professor Young notes
that "contested secessions are far more numerous than peaceful ones..)5 6
Another survey of the politics of secession concludes that "[i]f there is
one constant in history apart from the universality of death and taxes, it
is the reluctance of states to part with territory.... [T]he key fact about
secession is that it is among the rarest of major political outcomes. '57
The second observation is that recent experience has shown that
there is a world of difference between elite agreement and popular
agreement on constitutional issues. In both the Meech Lake and
Charlottetown constitutional negotiations, there was unanimity between
the various governmental representatives. But this elite agreement was
insufficient to persuade a majority of the population to support the
proposed amendments. Thus, even if representatives of the Canadian
and Quebec governments were able to tentatively agree on the terms of
Quebec secession, this would not guarantee popular support for such an
agreement. And what do we know about popular attitudes about the
terms of Quebec's secession from Canada? Opinion polls have
consistently revealed quite contradictory expectations on the part of
Quebecers as opposed to Canadians in other parts of Canada. Thus,
while most Quebecers expect that if Quebec were to become sovereign
they would keep their Canadian citizenship and passports, that they
would be able to work within the rest of Canada as freely as they do now,
and that they would retain the Canadian dollar, in the Rest of Canada
(Roc) there is a strong majority with precisely the opposite
54 ibid. at 18-25.
55 See R. A. Young, The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1995); and G. Gibson, "In Hot or Cold Blood? A response to the C.D.
Howe forecast of the post-referendum world" (February 1995) Fraser Forum 5.
56 Young, ibid. at 129. Professor Young surveys comparative studies of secession.
57 M. Hechter, "The Dynamics of Secession" (1992) 35 Acta Sociologica 267 at 277.
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expectations 58 In short, it is inevitable that the terms of any separation
will directly contradict one or the other of these popular expectations.
This suggests that even if political elites were somehow able to cobble
together an agreement, the bargain would founder on the rocks of public
opinion.
This leads me to a consideration of the alternative
scenario-Quebec sovereignty being achieved unilaterally, based on a
Quebec UDI, in defiance of the requirements of the existing Canadian
Constitution.
III. LEGAL DISCONTINUITY: A QUEBEC UDI
In the event that Quebec were to attempt to jump outside of the
rules of the existing Canadian Constitution and secede unilaterally,
principles of public international law would come into play. Even
though Quebec has no right to secede unilaterally under Canadian
domestic law, it may be able to invoke the right to "self-determination of
peoples" in order to justify unilateral secession. Also relevant are the
principles of public international law respecting the territorial integrity
of newly independent states. Some commentators have claimed that the
principle utipossidetis would entitle Quebec to secede with its current
borders left intact. This section considers the relevance and application
of principles of public international law in the event of unilateral Quebec
secession.
A. Self-Determination and Secession in International Law
The right of "self-determination of peoples," while notoriously
vague and difficult to apply, has gradually come to be recognized as a
legal right in public international law.5 9 Articles 1(2) and 55 of the
United Nations Charter 60 both list "self-determination of peoples" as
goals of the United Nations. Similar statements can be found in other
58 See "CBC Prime Time News-SRC Le Point Poll," 16 February 1995, Questions 25B, 25E,
32C, and 32D (results based on 2,406 telephone interviews conducted between February 2 and 8,
1995). Other polls have consistently revealed a wide divergence of expectations between residents
in Quebec and those elsewhere in Canada as to the terms of separation.
59 See S.A. Williams, International Legal Effects of Secession by Quebec (North York: York
University Centre for Public Law and Public Policy, 1992).
60 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice
(New York: UN, 1989).
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United Nations instruments, including General Assembly Resolution
151461 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.62
While self-determination has come to be generally recognized as
a principle of customary international law, the important point for
purposes of the present discussion is that this has not been accompanied
by a recognition of a right of groups within existing states to secede.63
The right to self-determination has been used primarily to justify
decolonialization rather than secession. Moreover, states that have
relied upon the principle of self-determination to achieve independence
from colonial powers frequently oppose any secession efforts.64 The
territorial integrity of existing states is generally regarded as taking
priority over any right of secessionist self-determination.
The priority given to the principle of territorial integrity is
reflected in the various United Nations' declarations recognizing self-
determination. For example, General Assembly Resolution 1514, in
addition to recognizing the principle of self-determination, also states
that "[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the
national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible
with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."
The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations,65 after affirming the
right of self-determination, makes plain that this principle does not
compromise the territorial integrity of existing states:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or
political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance
with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above
61 Section 2 provides as follows: "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development." See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Teritories and
Peoples, GA. Res. 1514 (XV), UN GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, UN Doe. A/4684 (1961) 66.
62 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Adopted 19 December 1966 at Article 1, para. 1.
63 See L.C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1978) at 16-17; A. Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort
Sumter to Lithuania to Quebec (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) at 20; H. Hannum, Autonomy,
Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990) at 46.
64 See Buchheit, ibid. at 102.
65 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co.
operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV),
UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970) 124 [hereinafter Declaration on
Friendly Relations].
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and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.66
One recent commentator summarized international attitudes
and practice on this issue as follows:
[Tihe general practice of states opposes an extension of the right [to self-determination]
to people in self-governing territories. States understandably fear the threat to their
sovereignty, and the global community as a whole fears the instability and potential
violence inherent in the right. Hence, the inviolability of boundaries has become virtually
an axiom of international relations, especially among governments of former non-self-
governing territoriesf 7
Some jurists have suggested that the wording quoted above from
the Declaration on Friendly Relations may have opened the door to a
limited right of secession in cases where an existing state is not
representative of the entire population.68 But it is clear that even if any
such exception has come to be recognized, Quebec would not fall within
it. International law commentators and publicists who have examined
Quebec's right to self-determination are virtually unanimous in
concluding that Quebec is not subject to any systematic discrimination
that would permit it to claim the right to secede from Canada. The
following conclusion is representative of the opinions that have been
expressed on the application of the principle of self-determination to
Quebec:
Permitting groups such as the Quebecois in Canada to invoke the right of secession based
upon cultural or group identity alone would threaten to open the floodgates of secession,
and could exacerbate group conflicts. It is difficult to imagine any clear limits upon a
secession right that permits groups to secede from pluralistic, nonoppressive states such
as Canada.69
6 6 bid., "The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."
67 JAR. Nafziger, "Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention in a Community of
Power" (1991) 20 Den. J. Int'l Law & Pol'y 9 at 19. Similar conclusions are reached by G.
Marchildon & E. Maxwell, "Quebec's Right of Secession Under Canadian and International Law"
(1992) 32 Va. J. Int'l L 583 at 614; L Brilmayer, "Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial
Interpretation" (1991) 16 Yale J. Int'l L. 177 at 178; and P. Thornberry, "Self-Determination,
Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments" (1989) 38 Int'l & Cmp. L.Q.
867.
68 See Buchheit, supra note 63 at 94.
69 L. Eastwood Jr., "Secession: State Practice and International Law After the Dissolution of
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia" (1993) 3 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L 299 at 342. For similar
conclusions to the effect that Quebec does not possess the right to secede under international law,
see T. Franck et al., "L'int6grit6 territoriale du Quebec dans l'hypoth~se de l'accession A la
soverainetd" in Commission d'dtude des questions aff&entes d l'accession du Qudbec d la souveraineti:
Projet de Rapport (Annexe) (September 1992) at 382-83 [hereinafter "Five Experts' Opinion"]; G.
Burdeau, "Avis du Professeur Genevieve Burdeau" in Elements d'analyse 6conomiquepertinents d la
OSGO ODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
There have been some suggestions that state practice with
respect to the recent breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
indicate that customary international law may be in the nascent stages of
a transition toward the recognition of a secession right.70 In particular,
the willingness of the international community to recognize the
independence of the Baltic Republics as well as the Republics of
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina could be seen as the
beginning of a pattern of conduct evincing the existence of a right of
secession under customary international law.
However, upon closer examination, these precedents do not
support the recognition of any new principle of customary international
law. In the case of the Baltics, there was no international recognition of
the sovereignty of the Baltic states until Russian President Boris Yeltsin
endorsed Latvian and Estonian independence in August 1991. 71 In
effect, the international community did not recognize the new states
until they had already achieved de facto sovereignty. Moreover, the
Baltics had formerly been sovereign states that had been illegally
annexed by the Soviet Union in 1941. Thus,"even if the response of the
international community suggests some acceptance of secession, such
support may mark only the beginning of international recognition of a
limited secession right applicable to illegally annexed territories rather
than a general right of secession." 72
As for the independence of the Republics of the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (sFRY), this was not a case of secession
but of the dissolution of an existing state. This matter was addressed by
the Arbitration Commission appointed by the European Community
(Ec) in late 1991 to render advisory opinions on legal issues arising in the
context of the dissolution of the sFRY.73 The first question submitted to
the Arbitration Commission by Lord Carrington, the President of the
Conference on Yugoslavia, was as follows:
rvision du statut politique et constitutionnel du Qu~be4 (Document de travail no. 1) (Quebec:
Commission sur l'avenir politique et constitutionnel du Qudbec, 1991) (Annexe B-4) at 540-42;
Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 67 at 618; and Williams, supra note 59 at 20-22.
70 See Eastwood, ibid at 300.
71 See ibid at 316-21 for a review of the relevant events.
72 Ibid at 321.
73 For background on the appointment of the Arbitration Commission, see "Conference on
Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising from the Dissolution of
Yugoslavia," 4 July 1992, 31 LLM. 1488 ("Introductory Note" by Maurizio Ragazzi).
[VOL 33 NO. I
The Law And Politics of Quebec Secession
We find ourselves with a major legal question.
Serbia considers that those Republics which have declared or would declare themselves
independent or sovereign have seceded or would secede from the SFRY which would
otherwise continue to exist.
Other Republics on the contrary consider that there is no question of secession, but that the
question is one of a disintegration or breaking-up of the SFRY as the result of the concuning
will of a number of Republics ... I should like the Arbitration Commission to consider the
matter in order to formulate any opinion or recommendation which it might deem
useful. 74 [emphasis added]
The Arbitration Commission found in favour of the second view
put forward in Lord Carrington's question-namely, that the SFRY was
"in the process of dissolution." In reaching this conclusion, the
Commission noted that the SFRY Republics had clearly expressed their
desire for independence, that the composition and workings of the
essential organs of the Federation no longer met the criteria of
participation and representativeness inherent in a federal state, and that
the authorities of the Federation and the Republics had shown
themselves to be powerless to enforce respect for succeeding cease-fire
agreements. 75
The dissolution of a state means that it no longer has legal
personality. Therefore, the member states of the EC could recognize the
independence of the former Yugoslav Republics without thereby calling
into question the principle of the territorial integrity of existing states.76
No question of secession arose and no precedent that might be invoked
to undermine the territorial integrity of other existing states would be
created by recognition. Less than two months after the rendering of this
initial advisory opinion, the Ec and its member states recognized
Slovenia and Croatia as independent states.77
Unlike the former Soviet Union in relation to the Baltics,
Canada has not illegally annexed the territory of Quebec. I also assume,
for purposes of this opinion, that the Canadian state would continue to
74 
"Conference on Yugoslavia-Arbitration Committee: Opinion No. 1," 20 November 1991,
31 I.LM. 1494 [hereinafter "Opinion No. 1"].
75 TbiaL at 1496-97.
76 The Arbitration Commission later found that the process of dissolution had concluded by
July 1992. See "Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia-Arbitration Commission: Opinion No. 8," 4
July 1992, 31 I.LM. 1521 [hereinafter "Opinion No. 8"].
77 The EC recognized Croatia even though the Arbitration Commission, in an opinion
rendered in early January 1992, had found that Croatia did not yet meet the EC's guidelines for
recognition: see "Conference on Yugoslavia-Arbitration Commission: Opinion No. 5," 11 January
1992,31 LLM. 1503 at 1505.
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exist following the secession of Quebec. Therefore, in my view, the
recent state practice in respect of the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia
does not establish precedents that would be helpful or relevant to
Quebec in any secession from Canada.
B. Quebec's Territorial Integrity
The conclusion reached in the previous section is that Quebec
has no "right" under international law to declare independence
unilaterally. This means that, in the event that Canada disputes the
validity of a Quebec umI, Quebec will attain statehood only in the event
that it is able to oust the jurisdiction of Canada over Quebec territory.
The criterion for Quebec statehood will be "the maintenance of a stable
and effective government over a reasonably well defined territory, to the
exclusion of the metropolitan State, in such circumstances that
independence is in fact undisputed, or manifestly indisputable."78 This
will be the test that other states will generally apply in determining
whether to recognize the new state of Quebec.
This leads to the following obvious question: what happens if
Quebec is able to exercise effective control over only a portion of the
territory that comprised the province of Quebec, with Canada remaining
in partial or complete control over the remainder? Such a possibility
seems realistic. The population of the northern portion of the province
of Quebec is made up of Aboriginal peoples, many of whom have
signified their desire to remain a part of Canada should Quebec choose
to secede. Other regions in the province have large concentrations of
anglophones or allophones who might similarly be expected to choose to
remain in Canada if this option were available to them. Since Quebec
lacks any organized military, it is not at all clear that it would be able to
enforce compliance on such dissident groups.
The analysis thus far would suggest that, in such a scenario, the
Quebec UDI would be effective only with respect to that territory over
which the new state had established effective control. This follows from
the basic proposition that Quebec has no right, either under Canadian
domestic law or international law principles, to unilaterally declare
independence with respect to the entire Quebec territory. Its claim for
statehood is ultimately based on political reality-on its ability to oust
the jurisdiction of the Canadian authorities over its territory.
78 See J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1979) at 266.
[VOL 33 NO. I
The Law And Politics of Quebec Secession
Accordingly, where any such ouster of Canada is only partial or
incomplete, Quebec's claim to political independence must be
correspondingly impaired or reduced.
However, certain commentators have suggested that the
principle uti possidetis, ita possideatis79 would guarantee Quebec its
existing borders in the event that it were to attain sovereignty. The uti
possidetis principle was first evoked and applied in respect of former
Spanish colonies in Central and South America, "the continent which
first witnessed the phenomenon of decolonization involving the
formation of a number of sovereign states on territory formerly
belonging to a single metropolitan state. 80 The essence of the principle
is that the territorial boundaries of former colonies should be respected
when those colonies achieve independence: "no question of
international boundaries could ever have occurred to the minds of those
servants of the Spanish Crown who established administrative
boundaries; uti possidetis juris is essentially a retrospective principle,
investing as international boundaries administrative limits intended
originally for quite other purposes."81 The purpose of the principle uti
possidetis has been described by the International Court of Justice as "to
prevent the independence and stability of new States being endangered
by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following
the withdrawal of the administering power."'8 2 The principle has also
been applied in the decolonization process in Africa, notwithstanding
the fact that it appears to conflict with the right of peoples in these newly
emerging states to self-determination.83
Given the origins and application of the principle utipossidetis, it
is difficult to see how it could be relevant to the attempted secession of
Quebec from Canada. This is because the principle has never been
invoked by a seceding state against a predecessor state. Rather, the
principle has been applied between former colonies in order to prevent
border disputes from arising upon the withdrawal of the authority of the
predecessor state. The fact that the predecessor state is no longer
asserting a territorial claim is of critical importance; the application of
79 
"As you possess, so may you possess."
80 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), [1986] I.CJ. Rep. 554 at 565
[hereinafter FrontierDispute].
81 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras: Nicaragua intervening),
[1992] I.CJ. Rep. 351 at 388.
82 Supra note 80 at 565.
83 lbid at 567.
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utipossidetis will therefore not compromise the territorial integrity of the
predecessor state. But it would be quite another matter entirely to apply
this principle in order to justify territorial claims of an administrative
unit which wishes to secede from the predecessor state. Thus, while
Spain had no particular interest or right to determine the post-
independence boundaries of its former colonies in Central America, this
did not mean that it thereby lost its right to prevent regions within its
own borders from seceding.
Notwithstanding the fact that utipossidetis would appear to have
no application to a case of secession, a recent opinion rendered by five
international experts came to an opposite conclusion.8 4 The "Five
Experts' Opinion" concedes that utipossideds has generally been applied
in colonial situations, but they argue that the principle has come to have
"universal application" in the resolution of border disputes involving
newly independent states.85 In coming to this quite extraordinary
conclusion, the Five Experts rely upon "Opinion No. 3" of the
Arbitration Commission established to offer advisory opinions on legal
issues arising in the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. One of the
matters submitted to the Arbitration Commission was whether the
"internal boundaries between Croatia and Serbia and between Bosnia-
Hercegovina and Serbia [could] be regarded as frontiers in terms of
public international law."8 6 The Arbitration Commission found that, in
the absence of an agreement between the parties to the contrary, the
principles of public international law would indicate that the former
administrative boundaries should constitute the new international
frontiers. This conclusion is expressed in the following passage in the
Commission's Opinion, a paragraph upon which the Five Experts rely
very heavily in order to support their own conclusions on this point:
Except where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become frontiers protected by
international law. This conclusion follows from the principle of respect for the territorial
status quo and, in particular, from the principle of uti possidetis. Uti possideis, though
initially applied in settling decolonization issues in America and Africa, is today
recognized as a general principle, as stated by the International Court of Justice in its
Judgment of 22 December 1986 in the case between Burkina Faso and Mali (Frontier
Dispute, [1986] ICJ Reports 554 at 565): "Nevertheless the principle is not a special rule
which pertains solely to one specific system of international law. It is a general principle,
which is logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence,
8 4 
"Five Experts' Opinion," supra note 69.
8 5 IbIc at 413-15, para. 2A6.
8 6 
"Conference on Yugoslavia-Arbitration Commission: Opinion No. 3," 11 January 1992,31
LL.M. 1499 [hereinafter "Opinion No. 3"].
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wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of
new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles.87
The Five Experts suggest that, in light of this reasoning, Quebec
would be able to rely on the principle uti possidetis in order to defeat
secessionist claims of Aboriginal peoples or minorities seeking to secede
from an independent Quebec. Whether or not this is the case, it says
nothing about the resolution of territorial disputes between Quebec and
Canada. Indeed, as between Canada and Quebec, the principle uti
possidetis would seem to favour Canada; as the Arbitration Commission
notes, the principle favours the "territorial status quo." The "territorial
status quo" is one in which the entire territory of Quebec is contained
within the Canadian state. Accordingly, if we wished to maintain the
territorial status quo, we would simply affirm our earlier conclusion,
namely, that the territorial integrity of Canada takes precedence over
any right of self-determination possessed by Quebec.
In fact, if one carefully reads the entire Opinion No. 3 (rather
than the portions quoted by the Five Experts) it becomes clear that
territorial disputes in the former Yugoslavia were entirely different from
any that would arise upon the attempted secession of Quebec from
Canada. The Arbitration Commission began its Opinion No. 3 by
referring to an earlier Opinion in which it had found that "the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution. 88 The
Commission observed that the principles it was about to announce
would apply "once the process in the sFRY [i.e., its dissolution] leads to
the creation of one or more independent States." This reference to the
dissolution of SFRY explains how the Commission was able to state that
the application of the principle utipossidetis would favour the territorial
status quo. Upon dissolution a state no longer has legal personality.
The SFRY no longer having a territorial claim, the only remaining issue
would be how to resolve border disputes between the newly independent
Republics of the former SFRY. In effect, the situation resembled the
decolonialization process in Central and South America following the
withdrawal of Spanish authority.
One could see how this analysis might become relevant or
applicable in the event that the Canadian state were to fragment into a
number of successor states and border disputes were to arise between
the new successor states. Suppose, for example, that both Ontario and
Quebec were to emerge as independent, sovereign states, following the
87 bid at 1500.
88 Supra note 74 at 1497.
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dissolution of Canada, and that a border dispute were to develop
between Ontario and Quebec. In this situation, we would not be dealing
with a dispute between a seceding state and a predecessor state, i.e.,
Canada, that could assert a prior or superior claim over disputed
territory. Rather, the border dispute would involve the two successor
states of Ontario and Quebec, neither of whom would have a claim to
any of the provincial territory of the other. In this context, it is at least
plausible to imagine the border dispute being resolved in accordance
with the utipossidetis principle referred to above, so that pre-existing
provincial borders would continue to govern, absent an agreement by
both parties to the contrary.
But a border dispute between Canada and a province attempting
to secede is quite a different matter entirely. Here the predecessor state
-Canada-has not fragmented or dissolved. The principle of uti
possidetis cannot be applied in a manner so as to undermine the
territorial integrity of Canada.
Accordingly, I conclude that the principle utipossidetis has no
application to a border or any other territorial dispute between Canada
and Quebec. In my view, Quebec's territorial integrity is not guaranteed
under any principle of public international law in the event that it
attempts to secede unilaterally from Canada.
C. A Quebec umi: Legally Possible But Politically Impossible
I have argued elsewhere that a Quebec UDI would be challenged
by Canada, leading to a disastrous contest for supremacy between the
Canadian and Quebec governments08 9 Some commentators have
questioned'my claim that Canada would resist a Quebec UDM, arguing
that the financial markets would force Canada to accept "UDI with a
wink."90 Professor Woehrling, on the other hand, has recently argued
that Canada would initially oppose a Quebec UDM, but suggests that
eventually Canada would give in to pressure from the United States and
France to normalize relations with QuebecY1
In my view, a Quebec UDi is simply not feasible if it is opposed by
Canada. Simply put, Quebec does not have the resources needed to
withstand the political and economic whirlwind that would be unleashed
89 See Cooler Heads, supra note 3 at 25-30.
9 0 See A. Freeman & P. Grady, Dividing the House: Planning for a Canada Without Quebec
(Toronto: Harper Collins, 1995) at 41.
91
"Les aspects juridiques," supra note 3 at 35.
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by a contest for legal supremacy between Quebec and Canada. If a UDI
were even a possibility, Quebec's ability to borrow on international
markets would be severely constrained, if not eliminated. International
capital markets would be unwilling to lend money to a regime whose
very existence was uncertain. The Quebec government would also face
widespread resistance to a UDI from its own population, and this
resistance would increase once it became apparent that the UDI would
involve real economic hardship for the Quebec population. There are
simply no international precedents for a state even attempting to secede
unilaterally with the support of only 50 to 55 per cent of its population,
much less succeeding in the attempt.
Of course, the government of Canada would also face a financial
crisis if Quebec were to attempt to secede unilaterally, particularly since
Quebec would not be liable for any of the existing Canadian debt if the
UDI were successful. On the other hand, Canada controls the airports,
seaports, key federal buildings, and all the entry points into Quebec. In
other words, there would appear to be no way for Quebec to achieve
effective control over its territory absent Canadian agreement.
Moreover, given the implications of a successful UDI for the future
Canadian debt load, Canada could be expected to contest the uri
vigorously even in the face of a short-term fiscal and liquidity crisis.
Some commentators have labelled a discussion of such scenarios
as undemocratic and contributing to a "propaganda war."9 2 If
Quebecers vote "yes" in a referendum, it is claimed, the Roc will quickly
agree to reasonable terms of separation. The Roc will act rationally and
pursue a cooperative strategy because the costs associated with any other
response are unacceptably high.
But this criticism misses the point of the arguments that I and
others have been raising in respect of the consequences of a Quebec urn'.
My claim is precisely that Roc will react rationally in the face of a
Quebec uin-but that "rationality" in this context means acting in the
Roc's own self-interest, rather than in the interests of Quebec. In
particular, the ROC will insist that Quebec can secede only on terms and
conditions that are acceptable to both parties. Far from being
"irrational," this insistence on joint terms and conditions is simply a
natural response to any aggressive attempt by Quebec to jump outside of
the existing Constitution.
As for the suggestion that raising such concerns is somehow
"undemocratic," surely democracy requires that all Canadians (including
those in Quebec) have a right to know what is really at stake in the
92 See D. Latouche, "The New Kingmakers" (January-February 1995) 3:4 Canada Watch 53.
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forthcoming referendum. Otherwise, citizens are left to make a
fundamental choice about their future without a clear understanding of
the likely consequences. In fact, it is those who seek to suppress a full
and open debate through charges of "economic terrorism" who are the
real elitists, since they assume that ordinary citizens will be incapable of
making an informed judgment if they are exposed to arguments on both
sides of the issue.
IV. CONCLUSION: WOULD POLITICAL ASSOCIATION
RESOLVE THE IMPASSE?
The Quebec government has indicated that the referendum
question will make some reference to continued political and economic
association between an independent Quebec and Canada. Apparently,
the existence of these linkages will not be a precondition to a declaration
of sovereignty, but are thought to be a virtual certainty once sovereignty
has been achieved.
The Agreement signed on June 12, 1995 (the "June 12
Agreement") between Messers. Jacques Parizeau, Lucien Bouchard and
Mario Dumont suggests that the joint political institutions contemplated
by the Quebec government would be based on the European
Community institutions. The June 12 Agreement proposes the
establishment of a Council of Ministers, with equal representation from
Canada and Quebec. The decisions of the Council would require
unanimity, giving each side a veto. A permanent Secretariat would be
established to assist the Council of Ministers. A joint Parliamentary
Assembly would also be established, with representation based on the
relative population of Canada and Quebec. But the Assembly would not
possess any legislative powers, its only authority being to make
recommendations or pass non-binding resolutions regarding the
decisions of the Council. The Assembly could also hold public hearings.
Finally, the June 12 Agreement proposes the establishment of a Tribunal
to make binding interpretations of the treaty.
European Community institutions have been criticized on
grounds that they are almost entirely executive-driven.93 The European
Council of Ministers provides for governmental interaction but its
decisions are not subject to ratification by the home parliaments of the
93 For a detailed discussion, see PJ. Monahan, Political and Economic Integration: The
European Experience and Lessons for Canada (North York: York University Centre for Public Law
and Public Policy, 1992).
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Member States, and Council deliberations often occur behind closed
doors. The only elected Community institution is the Parliament, but its
role is largely advisory and it lacks the scope of initiative associated with
a domestic parliament. Recent reforms have increased the powers of
the parliament, and there are calls for granting the parliament an equal
role with the Council of Ministers in the legislative processY4
The June 12 Agreement proposes institutions that are even more
executive-driven than those in Europe. At least in Europe, the
parliament is sometimes required to approve decisions of the Council of
Ministers; failure to obtain parliamentary approval forces the Council to
take decisions by unanimous vote, rather than through a qualified
majority. The June 12 Agreement does not contemplate any approval
powers for the joint Canada-Quebec parliament.
Even more problematic is the proposal for equal Quebec-
Canada representation on the Council of Ministers, and for granting a
veto to each party. In the early years of the European Community, the
most important decisions of the Council of Ministers required
unanimous consent. This requirement of unanimous consent produced
incredible delay and deadlock within the Council such that, by the mid-
1980s, it was widely recognized that the requirement of unanimity had to
be abandoned. Important reforms introduced in 1986 provided for the
most important decisions to be taken by a qualified majority.
The European experience suggests that the Council of Ministers
proposed in the June 12 Agreement would be a recipe for deadlock and
division. It is evident that the proposal for equal Quebec-Canadian
representation on the Council of Ministers with vetoes for each side
would clearly be a non-starter in ROC. The ROC would simply not be
interested in giving a veto over important ROC policy decisions-such as
the size of the budget deficit-to a foreign country one-third its size. So
the only possible structure (assuming for the sake of argument that a
Council of Ministers were to be created) would be some form of
weighted representation, with most decisions taken by majority vote
rather than through unanimity.
It is immediately apparent that Quebec would be worse off
under this arrangement than it is under the status quo. The Quebec
government is not currently required to submit its budget for approval
by Ottawa. But if a Council of Ministers were created with majority
representation from Roc and with no general Quebec veto, a "sovereign"
94 See "Conference of the European Community Parliaments: Final Declaration" (1990)
Agence Europe No. 1668.
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Quebec would be required to obtain budget approval from a joint
political body in which it was in a permanent minority position.
In fact, Quebec would be outvoted on every issue in which it
formed the minority before a Ministerial Council. Under such a model,
the Prime Minister of Canada would necessarily be a non-Quebecer, and
the Canadian government, with no Quebec representation, would
effectively control joint decisions. Quebec could expect to be outvoted
on any issue in which its interests were at odds with the interests of any
significant part of ROC. This is in stark contrast to the role of Quebec
MPs in the Canadian Parliament, where a Quebec MP has been Prime
Minister of Canada for 26 of the past 27 years and Quebec MPs always
occupy key cabinet posts.
Given this analysis, it might be thought that ROC would have an
interest in establishing joint political institutions with Quebec, on the
assumption that it would have a majority position and thus be able to
effectively control joint decision-making. In fact, however, ROC would
likely have no interest in establishing such joint institutions, even if it
were in a majority along the lines described above, albeit for different
reasons.
From ROC'S point of view, a political association with an
independent Quebec would involve the establishment of an additional
level of government. The ROC would have the governments of the
remaining nine provinces, the new "national" government of ROC plus
the government and bureaucracy associated with any joint political
institutions with Quebec. There would also be a complete overlap
between the responsibilities of any joint ROC-Quebec political
institutions and the "domestic" governments in ROC. There is little
public support, and certainly no demonstrable public need, for
additional layers of government and for increasing overlap and
duplication. In short, I believe that it is highly unlikely that ROC would
be willing to agree to joint political institutions following secession, even
assuming that the terms of secession were otherwise agreed to in
advance.
The point for purposes of the present discussion is that ROC
would not even be willing to contemplate any discussions on the point if
Quebec were to proceed with a UDI. A UDI would involve a unilateral
repudiation of Canadian federalism, without any agreement on
contentious issues such as debt division, currency, territory, and the
rights of aboriginal peoples and minorities in Quebec. Such unilateral
action would poison the well between ROc and Quebec for many years to
come, regardless of whether the UDI proved successful. In the face of a
UDI, ROC would flatly refuse to talk about creating joint political
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institutions for a considerable period of time, that is, years following
secession.
Some have argued that this kind of negative response would be
"irrational" and that ROC would eventually come to recognize its
common interest in rebuilding joint political institutions with a sovereign
Quebec. But the only truly "irrational" decision in this scenario would
be Quebec's resort to a UDi-a declaration which is certain to
significantly reduce the living standards of all Canadians, particularly
those living in Quebec. Political leaders who pursue a. deliberately
uncooperative strategy should not be surprised when they are met with
an identical response from those whose interests they have chosen to
disregard.
To conclude where I began, the legal issues that I have explored
in this paper will certainly not prove decisive in Quebecers' choice of
whether to remain within Canada. But neither are they irrelevant to that
decision. I have suggested that there are significant legal obstacles faced
by the Quebec government in its attempt to attain sovereignty. The
existence of those impediments suggests, at the very least, that the road
to sovereignty is likely to be rather more bumpy, circuitous, and
dangerous than the Quebec government has thus far predicted.
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